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Abstract
Online local budget transparency (OLBT) has been recognized as an important 
feature of good governance. Accordingly, in this paper, OLBT is measured in all 
128 cities and a sample of 100 municipalities in Croatia using several key local 
budget documents published on local government websites. Using a fixed effect 
Poisson panel model covering the 2013-2017 period, it is shown that along with 
residents’ income and fiscal capacity of local governments, political ideology and 
political competition determine the level of OLBT. This paper contributes to the 
growing body of budget transparency literature by establishing the importance of 
political factors as determinants of OLBT in this former socialist, fiscally 
centralized EU member state and reveals the curious stubbornness of the citizens 
who consistently vote for non-transparent politicians. The main finding is that 
political factors (political ideology and political competition) matters in 
determining OLBT, resulting in suboptimal equilibrium of local governments with 
low levels of OLBT. The local incumbent concludes that OLBT is not a high 
priority and that his/her constituency will not hold it against him/her. In this 
environment such a conclusion stands owing to the fact that voters who are 
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stubborn in their voting patterns refuse to change the incumbent who created 
nontransparency. 
Key words: online budget transparency, local government, Croatia, political 
economy, panel data model
JEL classification: H11, H70
1. Introduction
Budget transparency (BT) and public participation are crucial for good governance 
(e.g., Lowatcharin and Menifield, 2015). A transparent budget can be properly 
analyzed, and its implementation can be easily monitored, enabling citizens 
to participate (meaningfully) in improving the efficiency and effectiveness of 
public policies, holding incumbents accountable for their electoral promises, and 
increasing citizens’ trust in government (e.g., Piotrowski and Van Ryzin, 2007; 
Ríos, Benito, & Bastida, 2017). Although there are also some arguments against too 
much BT (see Kopits and Craig, 1998), BT has been encouraged or recommended 
by numerous international organizations (e.g., OECD, 2002).
Most existing research has focused on BT at the central government level (e.g., 
Ríos et al., 2013). However, one would expect the citizens to be more interested in 
local government expenditures, such as how much a local public transport system 
would cost or what could happen with a local playground. 
The development of tools for disclosing financial information, enabled by 
information and communications technologies (ICT), has led to improvements in BT 
and accountability (Puron-Cid and Bolívar, 2017), and governments are increasingly 
publishing budget information online (Corella, 2011) using websites to inform citizens 
and/or for attempt to hear their voice.5 Because of these changes, there is a growing 
interest focused on the determinants of online local fiscal/budget transparency (OLF/
BT) (e.g., Lowatcharin and Menifield, 2015; Sedmihradská, 2015; Birskyte, 2018; 
Chen & Han, 2019). Unfortunately, so far, this trend has largely circumvented fiscally 
centralized post-socialist countries, such as Croatia. Possible explanations for the lack 
of interest in OLF/BT can be grouped into institutional design and citizens’ attitude. 
Due to institutional settings, local government units (LGUs) in fiscally centralized 
post-socialist countries provide fewer public goods compared to their peers in fiscally 
decentralized countries. On the other side, citizens’ themselves neglect their role in 
the budgetary process because they usually see public money as both “everybody’s 
and nobody’s” and think that there is no point in engaging into budgetary process (Ott 
and Bronić, 2015). 
5 The internationally comparable Open Budget Index recently also adopted online availability as the 
minimum necessary condition for determining the public availability of a key budget document 
International Budget Partnership (IBP) (2018).
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But, due to importance of this topic, still since 2013 OLBT in Croatia is measured 
by the number of key local budget documents (executive budget proposal, citizens’ 
guide and enacted budget) issued on time on local government websites (Ott 
et al., 2017). This paper contributes to the empirical assessment of OLF/BT by 
analyzing the importance of a set of political variables in Croatia and noting that 
citizens stubbornly vote for nontransparent politicians. The paper investigates two 
hypotheses. Firstly, that there is a negative and statistically significant relationship 
between a right-wing political incumbent and the level of OLBT. Secondly, that 
there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between political 
competition and the level of OLBT.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we present literature review regarding 
definition and determinants of OLF/BT and then, we present the methodology, 
empirical data and analysis, results and conclusions.
2. Literature review
2.1. Definition/measurement of OLF/BT
The first and probably the largest problem in the analysis of the determinants of 
OLF/BT most likely arises from the fact that there is no unique measure of OLF/
BT, with authors defining and measuring it differently. Some authors argue that fiscal 
transparency (FT) “is a complex phenomenon to be measured by single variable or 
indicator” (Puron-Cid and Bolívar, 2017: 4) and that results, to some degree, always 
depend on the context in which the research is performed (e.g. Muñoz et al., 2016). 
Therefore, it is not easy to compare different results or determine whether the results 
could be valid for all or numerous LGUs in different countries. Several questions also 
arise as follows: should one focus on fiscal and/or budget transparency, online and/or 
hardcopy transparency, or mandatory and/or voluntary transparency?
Most studies in the literature focus on FT (e.g. Esteller-Moré and Otero, 2012), 
which is a broader concept than BT, although many authors use these concepts 
synonymously.6 Other authors focus on even broader concepts, including corporate 
and social planning, decision making, policy information and/or policy outcome 
6 For example, OECD (2002: 7), defines BT as “the full disclosure of all relevant fiscal information in 
a timely and systematic manner”, which rather resembles what a definition of FT should be. Kopits 
and Craig (1998: 1) define FT as “openness toward the public at large about government structure and 
functions, fiscal policy intentions, public sector accounts, and projections. It involves ready access 
to reliable, comprehensive, timely, understandable, and internationally comparable information on 
government activities – whether undertaken inside or outside the government sector – so that the 
electorate and financial markets can accurately assess the government’s financial position and the 
true costs and benefits of government activities, including their present and future economic and 
social implications.”
Katarina Ott, Velibor Mačkić, Mihaela Bronić • Political Stubbornness and Online... 
556 Zb. rad. Ekon. fak. Rij. • 2019 • vol. 37 • no. 2 • 553-585
transparency (e.g., del Sol, 2013; Grimmelikhuijsen and Welch, 2012). Our 
research focuses only on budgets and budget transparency, similar to the research of 
the International Budget Partnership (IBP) (2018) and World Bank (2015).7
We have focused our research only on online local budget transparency owing 
to the fact that numerous authors focus only on OLF/BT (e.g. Esteller-Moré and 
Otero, 2012; Gandía and Archidona, 2008; García-Tabuyo et al., 2016; Gesuele and 
Metallo, 2017; Lowatcharin and Menifield, 2015; Pina et al., 2010; Serrano-Cinca 
et al., 2008; Styles and Tennyson, 2007; Tavares and da Cruz, 2014; Sedmihradská, 
2015; Birskyte, 2018). However, there are some authors who analyze both online 
and hardcopy formats of information (e.g., Guillamón et al., 2011; Laswad et al., 
2005), but some scholars pinpoint the fact that the determinants of each format vary 
and that this should be considered (see Muñoz et al., 2016). 
Finally, Guillamón et al. (2011), del Sol (2013), Araujo and Tejedo-Romero (2016), 
and Araujo and Tejedo-Romero (2017) analyze both mandatory and voluntary 
transparency. Some authors distinguish between mandatory and voluntary 
transparency (e.g. Gandía et al., 2016; Gesuele and Metallo, 2017), while only a few 
authors focus entirely on voluntary disclosure (e.g., Laswad et al., 2005; Serrano-
Cinca et al., 2008). This paper focuses on both mandatory and voluntary OLBT, 
defined as the possibility for citizens to obtain complete, accurate, and timely 
information presented in an understandable form about an LGU’s budgets from 
its website (Ott et al., 2017). However, similar to da Cruz et al. (2016), this paper 
analyzes only the timely availability of documents, assuming that the disclosed 
information is complete, accurate and presented in an understandable form.
2.2. Explanatory theories of budget transparency
Numerous theories/hypotheses have been used to explain the differences in OLF/
BT (principal-agent, neo-institutional, stewardship, fiscal illusion, legitimacy, rule-
of law theory, and bureaucratic behavior model); however, for this work, principal-
agent, legitimacy and rule-of-law theories are the most useful.
Principal-agent theory argues that the problem between a principal (citizens) 
and agent (politician) arises when a politician (better informed than citizens) 
puts his/her own interests before the contrary interests of the citizens whom 
s/he represents (e.g., Ferejohn, 1986). A politician’s interests might include rents, 
such as re-election, the advancement of his/her political career, and the increase 
of his/her income (Zimmerman, 1977). Ferejohn (1986) notes that the politician 
chooses how to make his actions evident to the principal and assumes that the 
7 The World Bank (2015: 1) defines BT as “the extent and ease with which citizens can access 
information about and provide feedback on government revenues, allocations, and expenditures”. A 
similar view has been described by the International Budget Partnership (IBP) (2018).
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politician’s compensation is derived in the form of rents that are proportional to 
the scale of government. Citizens are also self-interested, wanting to know what 
agents are doing with their money, and thus under the threat of being replaced, a 
politician is incentivized to choose a level of transparency above zero, leading to 
larger budgets. Similarly, to the principal-agent theory second generation of fiscal 
federalism models explain principals’ motives assuming that politicians have goals 
that often diverge from maximizing citizens welfare and thus elections could allow 
citizens to influence their destiny by throwing bad politicians out. That threat of 
being thrown out of office incentivizes politicians to make decisions that honor 
citizens rights (Weingast, 2009). Furthermore, (Ferejohn, 1999) also argues that 
left-wing governments, wanting a larger public sector, are expected to implement 
even greater levels of transparency. Lassen (2000) notes that, in accordance with 
principal-agent theory, voters prefer more public goods and larger budgets when 
transparency increases.
Legitimacy theory claims that if an LGU’s legitimacy is threatened, the LGU 
will disclose its information hoping that this will increase the LGU’s legitimacy 
and the reputation of local public officials (e.g., Araujo and Tejedo-Romero, 2016; 
Hoffman, 2001). Alternatively, it could be argued that offering an image of good 
governance, as a response to external pressure is a way to secure the legitimacy of 
the LGU (Pina et al., 2010). Incumbents in LGUs with higher budgetary revenues 
might be more concerned about losing their positions and, consequently, have 
more interest in proving their efficient management by voluntarily disseminating 
information (Muñoz et al., 2016).
Rule-of-law theory argues that all government units must act in accordance with 
and within the limits of the law. It is further argued that the law should govern a 
nation (government) and not the arbitrary decisions of individual government 
officials (IAS Score, 2018). Accordingly, it is expected that if the publication of a 
key budget document is stipulated by law, more LGUs will publish it. 
2.3. Development of hypotheses
The dominant drivers of OLF/BT have still not been identified, although different 
authors have used numerous socio-demographic, fiscal, and political variables (please 
see the remaining part of the section for these conclusions). The most commonly 
used socio-demographic variables are number/density of population, residents’ 
wealth (income), and other characteristics of population, such as age, education, 
gender, unemployment, and access to the internet. Usually, the used fiscal variables 
are measures of a LGUs’ wealth, debt, surplus/deficit, intergovernmental transfers, 
and tax revenues. Regarding political variables, authors use the ideology of the 
executive/legislative body in LGUs, different measures of political competition, and 
characteristics of a political leader (tenure, age, gender, etc.).
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OLF/BT research mostly focuses on fiscally decentralized countries and rarely 
on fiscally centralized countries. Although the results are mixed, the following 
variables emerge as the most likely determinants: residents’ income per capita 
(p.c.), LGUs’ wealth (fiscal capacity)8, access to the internet, political ideology, 
political competition, and population (see Stanić, 2018). Thus, by controlling 
for four socio-demographic and fiscal variables which will be explained under 
the methodology section (population, residents’ income per capita, LGU’s fiscal 
capacity, internet access), this work focuses on two political variables (ideology 
and competition), establishing their importance and effect on OLBT. Accordingly, 
two following hypotheses are developed.
2.3.1. Political ideology
It is argued that both left- and right-wing parties promote BT and that alteration 
of power motivates BT, as all parties want to ensure that they will have access to 
information should they be voted out of power (Wehner and de Renzio, 2013). In 
contrast, Gesuele and Metallo (2017) argue that the ruling party’s political ideology 
may support a different e-government style and differently influence OLF/BT. Some 
other authors argue that left-wing parties are more transparent because they are 
more likely to expand public services and face greater transparency requirements 
from citizens (Caamaño-Alegre et al., 2013; Guillamón et al., 2011). del Sol (2013) 
also stressed that left-wing governments might be more sensitive to the need 
to provide BT. It is argued that according to both principal-agent and legitimacy 
theory, it is expected that LGUs that provide more public services publish more 
budget documents online.
Most authors find political ideology insignificant for OLF/BT (e.g., Esteller-Moré 
and Otero, 2012; García-Tabuyo et al., 2016), while Gandía et al. (2016) find that 
left-wing governments are more transparent. Accordingly, the following hypothesis 
is advanced:
H1. There is a negative and statistically significant relationship between a right-
wing political incumbent and the level of OLBT.
2.3.2. Political competition
Several authors have found that different measures of political competition 
encourage incumbents to be more responsive to the electorate and offer more OLF/
BT (e.g., Araujo and Tejedo-Romero, 2016; Esteller-Moré and Otero, 2012; Gandía 
and Archidona, 2008), while others have found political competition insignificant 
8 Fiscal capacity can be defined as the ability of an LGU to raise revenues for public spending on its 
territory Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev (2008).
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(Araujo and Tejedo-Romero, 2017; García-Tabuyo et al., 2016) or negatively 
correlated with OLF/BT (Laswad et al., 2005; Serrano-Cinca et al., 2008; Tavares 
and da Cruz, 2014). On the one hand, Piotrowski and Van Ryzin (2007) suggest 
that the voter turnout levels can be regarded as indicators of citizen involvement 
and commitment to participate in political matters, thus positively affecting OLF/
BT. On the other hand Birskyte (2018) argues that higher local turnout does not 
necessary mean that pro-reform officials are elected, and that this is especially 
true when local elites are proficient in securing local votes for themselves and 
Araujo and Tejedo-Romero (2017) argue that lower levels of voter turnout may be 
incentives for incumbents to increase transparency. 
Three measures of political competition (voter turnout, winning margin, and a 
Herfindahl-Hirschman-based measure of partisan fragmentation) are investigated. 
Some authors analyzing voter turnout find this variable insignificant (Serrano-
Cinca et al., 2008; Tavares and da Cruz, 2014), while García-Tabuyo et al. (2016) 
obtained negative (for mandatory disclosure) and insignificant results (for voluntary 
disclosure). Birskyte(2018) again analyzing 60 Lithuanian municipalities reports 
that turnout at local election is negatively related to budget transparency. Esteller-
Moré and Otero (2012) report that only in large municipalities (with more than 
5,000 inhabitants) greater voter turnout is associated with higher OLF/BT. Da Cruz 
et al. (2016) report that higher margin of victory (i.e. lower political competition) 
negatively affects OLF/BT. García and García (2008) report that the Herfindahl-
Hirschman-based measure of partisan fragmentation positively affects OLF/BT. 
Assuming that all three measures of political competition positively affect OLF/BT 
results, the following hypothesis is advanced:
H2. There is a positive and statistically significant relationship between political 
competition and the level of OLBT.
3. Methodology
The dependent variable (OLBT) is a count data variable ranging from 0 to 3. For 
each examined year, the variable measures if a LGU published on its website the 
executive budget proposal, the enacted budget, and the citizens’ guide. If all three 
documents are published, then OLBT is equal to 3 for the respective LGU. The 
OLBT has a Poisson distribution, and the resulting model is a fixed effects panel 
data model. The following logic was used with respect to the fixed effect model. 
The paper was concerned with the fixed effects themselves (e.g. political ideology 
of the local incumbent) and thus the aim was to place interpretation on exactly 
this as the possible explanation of low level of OLBT. Additionally, one could 
reasonably expect that fixed effects (e.g. ideology) have a relationship with other 
right-hand side variables (e.g. income per capita, winning margin, etc.). Since 
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there are no strict rules regarding when deciding whether to use fixed or random 
effects, empirical research rests on several econometric tests. The majority of 
papers uses Hausman (1978) test, but by using this test they neglect some serious 
problems that come with the test (e.g. the test relies on iid error terms and in panel 
data this is rarely the case, it cannot be used with clustered or robust standard 
errors, it cannot include time-invariant variables, it is a chi-squared distributed 
variable and yet it can be negative, etc.). In order to address these problems, the 
paper used Mundlak Alternative as the best available test. Mundlak (1978) argues 
that if there is any correlation between the unit fixed effects and the covariates 
then the fixed effects model should be favoured over the random effects model. 
This was the rationale in this paper, when deciding on the appropriate model 
(fixed versus random effect). Mundlak (1978) suggests modelling the unit-specific 
effects as:
αi = x–iθ + vi (1)
E(αi│x–i) = x–iθ  (2)
If θ = 0 then there is no correlation between αi and xi. Results of the diagnostic tests 
are provided in the Appendix 2.
Furthermore, baseline Poisson regression equation with robust variance estimates is 
used:
OLBTit = α0 + β1 INCit + β2 FCit + β3RIGHTit + β4WMit + uit (3)
where i denotes local unit and t time, α0 indicates a constant, and βi,i =1, 2, 3, 4 
indicates the estimated coefficients of independent variables. Independent variables 
are: political ideology of right-wing parties (RIGHT) and winning margin (WM). 
Control variables residents’ income per capita (INC) and fiscal capacity per capita 
(FC) have one-time lag, i.e., the OLBT in 2013 is explained by the 2012 INC. 
Although the OLBT variable is named e.g. OLBT 2013 because we are looking 
for the 2013 budget proposal, the 2013 enacted budget and the 2013 citizens’ 
guide these documents should have been published in 2012, thus we are using one-
time lag for all variables (except political). All political variables (ideology and 
competition) stem from the local elections held in 2009 (determining data for 2013) 
and 2013 (determining data for the 2014-2017 period). State and local elections 
are held every four years in Croatia. Since the local elections are always carried 
out in May, their effect on the examined publication of budget documents is shown 
only in the following year (the fiscal year in Croatia starts on January 1). Detailed 
description of independent variables is provided in Table 1 under Section 4.2.
Together with the baseline model, additional models are estimated that differ 
from the baseline model in the sense that they do not include RIGHT, which is 
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substituted with other ideological variables (LEFT – political ideology of left-wing 
party and LIBERAL – political ideology of liberal party) or an interaction variable 
(RFCRIGHT – the level of fiscal capacity in the richer LGUs with a right-wing 
incumbent).
Empirical controls
Fiscal control variable. Adequate fiscal resources are critical to enable LGUs to 
promote fiscal transparency online, and in that sense higher LGUs wealth enable 
LGUs to recruit better ICT equipment and skilled labor (Chen & Han, 2019). 
Attempting to determine whether an LGU’s wealth has any impact on OLF/BT, 
authors have used different proxies e.g. own per capita revenues (Gandía and 
Archidona, 2008; Laswad, Fisher, & Oyelere, 2005; Chen & Han, 2019; Gandía, 
Marrahí, & Huguet, 2016) or budget/tax revenues per capita (Guillamón, Bastida, & 
Benito, 2011; Ma & Wu, 2011). Laswad et al. (2005) argued that LGUs with better 
fiscal conditions usually provide more budget information. Laswad et al. (2005) 
and Guillamón et al. (2011) find a positive relationship between LGUs wealth and 
OLF/BT, while others find this variable insignificant in all or only some models 
(e.g., Gandía and Archidona, 2008; Ma & Wu, 2011). Since all Croatian LGUs 
have relatively own per capita revenues, and negligible tax autonomy, i.e. they can 
autonomy decide about only one tax (public land use tax) and similar applies for 
non-tax revenues which usually earmarked we decided to use a measure of fiscal 
capacity as a proxy for LGU’s wealth. Actually Laswad et al. (2005) also use as 
a proxy for LGUs wealth own revenue per capita (measured as general revenues 
other than intergovernmental transfers) which is very similar to our measure of 
fiscal capacity. Fiscal capacity in this work is measured by an LGU’s per capita 
current (operating) revenues minus grants. It is expected that LGU’s fiscal capacity 
enhances its level of OLBT.
Socio-demographic control variables. We employ residents’ income, population and 
internet access as control variables. According to Piotrowski and Van Ryzin (2007) 
and Styles and Tennyson (2007), residents with higher incomes have more access to 
and experience with the internet and, thus, demand more OLF/BT. As several authors 
have shown that residents’ per capita income is an important determinant of OLF/
BT (e.g., Lowatcharin and Menifield, 2015; Styles and Tennyson, 2007), it is used as 
a control variable. Mentioned authors find a positive impact of residents’ per capita 
income on OLF/BT; therefore, it is expected that higher residents’ income per capita is 
associated with higher the level of OLBT. Most authors argue that larger populations 
have larger budgets, more access to the internet and the ability to demand greater 
OLF/BT (e.g., García-Tabuyo et al., 2016); thus, this variable is used as a control 
variable. Larger cities usually have higher budgets for IT and larger administrative 
staffs, enabling them to achieve higher levels of OLF/BT (e.g., Caamaño-Alegre 
et al., 2013). Serrano-Cinca et al. (2008), Styles and Tennyson (2007) and Gesuele 
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and Metallo (2017) find a positive and statistically significant relationship between 
OLF/BT and the number of inhabitants. However, Esteller-Moré and Otero (2012) 
find a nonlinear relationship (in small municipalities, the relationship is negative, 
while it becomes positive for larger populations – arguing that this might reflect the 
greater capabilities of very big municipalities to fulfil their legal obligations), while 
García-Tabuyo et al. (2016) and Gandía and Archidona (2008) find population to be 
insignificant. In Croatia, most LGUs experience depopulation, and thus it is excepted 
that higher population size is associated with lower level of OLBT. Araujo and 
Tejedo-Romero (2017), among several other authors, argue that there is a positive 
relationship between internet access and the demand for OLF/BT. As the focus of 
this work is on the internet availability of budget documents, and several authors 
report that internet availability positively affects OLF/BT (e.g. Lowatcharin and 
Menifield, 2015), internet access is included as a control variable. However, it should 
be noted that García-Tabuyo et al. (2016) reported a positive effect of internet access 
on mandatory disclosures and a negative effect on voluntary disclosures. Still it is 
expected that access to the internet enhances the level of OLBT.
4. Empirical data and analysis
4.1. Local governments in Croatia
Croatia is divided into 20 counties (regional level), 128 cities and 428 municipalities 
(local level).9 LGUs’ obligations to publish their enacted budgets and midyear 
and year-end budget reports online is regulated by the Budget Act (2012) and the 
Act on the Right of Access to Information (2013), while the recommendation for 
publishing executive budget proposals and citizens’ guides online can be found in 
the Ministry of Finance (2012) Recommendation. However, there are no sanctions 
for LGUs that do not fulfill these legal requirements or recommendations. In this 
work, the online publication of one mandatory document (enacted budget) and two 
recommended (voluntary) documents (the executive budget proposal and citizens’ 
guide) are investigated because, for the 2013-2014 period, we do not have data 
about the publication of relevant midyear and year-end budget reports.
4.2. Sample, independent and dependent variables
The sample includes all Croatian cities (128) and a random sample of 100 
municipalities.10 To confirm or reject the stated hypothesis, the independent variables 
9 As the capital, Zagreb has a special status as both a city and county. In this work, Zagreb is classified 
as a city.
10 For more details about the selected sample, see (Ott et al., 2017). Counties were excluded in this 
article due to the small variability in their levels of OLBT, while the number of 100 municipalities is 
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are collected and classified into the following three groups: control, political ideology 
and political competition variables as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1: Definition of variables
Variable Description Source
Independent, control 
POP a logarithm of the population estimates for the 
municipality/city (2012-2016)
Croatian Bureau of Statistics 
(CBS) (2017)
INC a logarithm of the average residents’ income per 
capita (2012-2016)
(Croatian Bureau of Statistics 
(CBS), 2017; Ministry of 
Regional Development and EU 
Funds 2017)
FC a logarithm of annual fiscal capacity per capita 
calculated as operating revenues minus all 
grants (after the changes in the personal income 
tax system in 2015 and 2016)*
(Croatian Bureau of Statistics 
(CBS), 2017; Ministry of Finance 
2017)
INTERNET the percentage of households with broadband 
internet access and data transmission speeds of 
2 Mbit and more (2012-2016)
Croatian Regulatory Authority for 
Network Industries (2018)
Independent, political ideology 
RIGHT dummy variable denoting the political ideology 
of right-wing parties, with a value of 1 if 
the incumbent is a member of the Croatian 
Democratic Union (HDZ), Croatian Peasant 
Party (HSS) or a coalition in which these parties 
participate (2009 and 2013 local elections)
State Electoral Commission 
(2009), State Electoral 
Commission (2013) 
LEFT dummy variable denoting the political 
ideology of left-wing party, with a value of 
1 if the incumbent is a member of the Social 
Democratic Party (SDP) or a coalition in which 
this party participates (2009 and 2013 local 
elections)
State Electoral Commission 
(2009), State Electoral 
Commission (2013)
LIBERAL dummy variable denoting the political 
ideology of liberal party, with a value of 1 
if the incumbent is a member of the Istrian 
Democratic Assembly (IDS) or a coalition in 
which this party participates (2009 and 2013 
local elections)
State Electoral Commission 
(2009), State Electoral 
Commission (2013)
RFCRIGHT the level of FC in the richer LGUs with a 
right-wing incumbent* (2009 and 2013 local 
elections)
Ministry of Finance (2017) and 
State Electoral Commission 
(2009), State Electoral 
Commission (2013)
determined by the fact that, in 2013, a random sample of 100 municipalities was chosen for measuring 
the dependent variable (OLBT). In 2013 and 2014, there was simply no capacity to measure OLBT 
for all 428 Croatian municipalities.
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Variable Description Source
Independent, political competition 
WM winning margin or difference in the percentage 
points between the incumbent and the runner up 
in the first round of elections (2009 and 2013 
local elections)
State Electoral Commission 
(2009), State Electoral 
Commission (2013)
TOV turnout of voters in percentages in the local 
elections (2009 and 2013 local elections)
State Electoral Commission 
(2009), State Electoral 
Commission (2013)
HHGOV Herfindahl-Hirschman index of the local 
assembly calculated as the sum of the squared 
seat shares of two biggest parties/coalitions in 
the government (2009 and 2013 local elections)
State Electoral Commission 
(2009), State Electoral 
Commission (2013)
Dependent variable
OLBT a simply constructed data count index ranging 
from 0 to 3 measured by the annual number of 
the three local documents – executive budget 
proposal, enacted budget and citizens’ guide – 
published on the website of each municipality 
and city (2013-2017)
Ott et al. (2017) 
Note: *From January 1, 2015, to January 1, 2016, there were two changes in the personal income 
tax sharing system between central and local governments (one big and the other smaller one 
affecting only a small fragment of LGUs).
Source: Authors’ systematization
The control variables include population (POP), residents’ income per capita (INC), 
fiscal capacity per capita (FC), and internet access (INTERNET). The political 
ideology variables are political ideology of right-wing parties (RIGHT), political 
ideology of left-wing party (LEFT), political ideology of liberal party (LIBERAL), 
and the level of fiscal capacity in the richer LGUs with a right-wing incumbent 
(RFCRIGHT). Political competition variables are winning margin (WM), turnout 
of voters in percentages in the local elections (TOV), and a Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index of the local assembly (HHGOV).
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the dependent variable OLBT and the 
remaining nine independent variables in the 2013-2017 period. The first part refers 
to the total sample (128 cities and 100 municipalities), while the second and third 
parts refer to the city and the municipality sample, respectively. Variables TOV 
and HHGOV are not included in the further analysis since they do not significantly 
contribute to the explanation of the dependent variable. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
OLBT 1135 1.179736 0.9216837 0 3
INC 1135 10.10154 0.2850981 9.100087 10.87998
FC 1135 3.074513 3.788127 0 9.307621
RIGHT 1135 0.5127753 0.5000571 0 1
WM 1135 23.26525 21.32724 0 100
POP 1135 8.65628 1.119838 5.666427 13.59692
INTERNET 1135 46.02301 15.67744 0 116.3099
City sample*
OLBT 635 1.407874 0.9342422 0 3
INC 635 10.22643 0.1925057 9.719073 10.73738
FC 635 3.150535 3.876562 0 9.307621
RIGHT 635 0.4897638 0.5002893 0 1
WM 635 19.71543 16.29036 0 100
POP 635 9.325669 0.9700605 7.31322 13.59692
INTERNET 635 49.86477 13.59638 12.60288 112.6886
LEFT 635 0.2062992 0.4049668 0 1
RLFCPCRIGHT 635 2.235401 3.592336 0 10.17448
Municipality sample
OLBT 500 0.89 0.8192939 0 3
INC 500 9.942934 0.3042644 9.100087 10.87998
FC 500 2.977965 3.674339 0 9.080471
RIGHT 500 0.542 0.4987319 0 1
WM 500 27.77352 25.69238 0 100
POP 500 7.806155 0.5999088 5.666427 9.350711
INTERNET 500 41.14398 16.76762 0 116.3099
LIBERAL 500 0.026 0.1592945 0 1
Note: *Popovača was classified as a municipality in 2013 when the project started (collecting 
the data and observing on-line local budget transparency) and remained in that sample in this 
analysis. Consequently, there are 127 cities in our sample. 
Source: Authors’ calculations
In the 2013-2017 period, cities and municipalities, on average, published 1.2 out of 
3 documents (so, it can be concluded that they are not very transparent). The mean 
value of OLBT is almost 50% higher in the city sample than in the municipality 
sample, while the mean value of the total sample is situated between them. The 
similar finding applies for two control variables (INC and FC), while in the case of 
variables that denote ideology (RIGHT) and political competition (WM), one can 
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report exactly the opposite. The mean value of right-wing ideology (RIGHT), and 
especially of the variable (WM), is higher in the municipality sample than in the city 
sample, pointing to lower political competition and the stronger presence of right-
wing ideology at the municipality level. Additionally, in approximately 50% of the 
analyzed LGUs in both the 2009 and 2013 elections, the right-wing incumbent was 
elected.11 Mean values of POP (log value of population) and INTERNET point 
to the expected conclusion since they are higher in city sample compared to the 
municipality sample 
In addition, on average, in the period 2013-2017, 33% of the analyzed LGUs 
published budget proposals, 70% enacted budgets and only 12% citizens’ guides. 
Obviously, in accordance with rule-of-law theory, more LGUs have published 
mandatory documents (enacted budget) than voluntary documents (budget proposal 
and citizens’ guide).
Table 3 shows the results of panel model estimations with fixed effects based on the 
Poisson distribution.12 
Six models are presented; of these, a baseline model is estimated in all three 
samples: total (city plus municipality), city, and municipality subsamples. In 
addition, two models are estimated in the city sample and one model in the 
municipality sample. These additional models differ with respect to ideology (they 
capture the effect of left-wing and liberal parties) or include an interaction variable 
connected to ideology (RFCRIGHT – level of fiscal capacity in the richer LGUs 
with a right-wing incumbent). With respect to the ideological variables (denoting 
leftist and liberal political views), a positive coefficient based on the theoretical 
and empirical literature is expected to be obtained. On the other hand, the goal of 
the interaction variable is to test whether ideology triumphs over economics, i.e., 
the intention is to check whether richer LGUs actually do increase their OLBT 
regardless of the ideological stance of the incumbent, or as is expected, richer units 
with right-wing incumbents actually reduce their level of OLBT. 
11 In 2009, the right-wing incumbent was elected in 109 LGUs, while, in 2013, in local elections, the 
right-wing incumbent was elected in 107 LGUs.
12 The empirical investigation also included ordered probit and multinominal logit models. Since the 
goodness-of-fit tests confirmed that the fixed effect Poisson panel models are optimal, these results 
are presented in the Appendix 3. In the remainder of the paper we analysed results from the FE 
Poisson model.
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In the total sample, baseline model 1 confirms the expected negative and 
statistically significant influence of a right-wing incumbent (RIGHT) on the level of 
OLBT. As expected, both control variables (INC and FC) have a positive influence 
on the level of OLBT. 
At the city level, baseline model 2, confirms the significant results obtained in the 
total sample (regarding RIGHT, INC and FC) and additionally reports a negative 
effect of the WM on the level of OLBT. The higher the WM (i.e. lower political 
competition) between the incumbent and the runner up is, the lower the level of 
OLBT. Model 3 includes an interaction variable that connects FC in richer cities 
(with FC higher than the average value of all units in the city sample) that have a 
right-wing incumbent (variable RFCRIGHT). The results again confirm a negative 
effect of a right-wing incumbent, with all the remaining variables (INC, FC, and 
WM) holding their signs and the level of significance, as in baseline model 2. Model 
4 includes an ideological variable that examines the effect of a left-wing incumbent 
on the level of OLBT and reports a positive effect. Of course, as was the case in the 
previous model 3, all the remaining variables (INC, FC, and WM) kept their signs 
and level of significance vis-à-vis OLBT.
At the municipality level, baseline model 5, tells a different story vis-à-vis 
rightwing political ideology – it does not matter, although both control variables 
(INC and FC) maintain their expected positive relationship with the level of OLBT. 
The last “expanded” model 6, includes an ideological variable that looks at the 
effect of a liberal incumbent and the level of OLBT. This model indicates a positive 
effect of the political ideology of a liberal party (LIBERAL) on the level of OLBT, 
with all the other control variables in the model (INC and FC) holding their positive 
and statistically significant effects on the level of OLBT in the municipality sample. 
Another interesting result on this level concerns WM. On the municipality level (in 
both model 5 and 6) unexpectedly it shows positive effects on OLBT. 
5. Results and discussion
With respect to the results presented in the Table 3 we can summarize the following 
conclusions. Paper presents three important results that add to the literature. 
First, results on the total and the city level confirm, for the first time, our hypothesis 
that there is a negative and statistically significant relationship between a right-wing 
political incumbent (RIGHT) and the level of OLBT. Theoretical underpinnings 
for this conclusion can be found within the agency theory. Previous research (Ott, 
Mačkić & Bronić, 2018; Ott et al., 2019) shows mixed results probably due to 
different methodology and time period investigated. This paper adds to the literature 
since it uses the longest available time period thus allowing for local elections and 
their effect on the OLBT to be properly included in the analysis. 
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It is also shown that political stubbornness, sticking to the right-wing ideology, 
is actually detrimental to OLBT in the total and city samples in Croatia. This 
conclusion stems from the below-average OLBT result in the 2013-2017 period 
and from the fact that approximately half of the local incumbents elected in both 
the 2009 and 2013 local elections were right-wing incumbents. Our conclusion 
about political stubbornness and sticking to the right-wing ideology, expands the 
existing literature on incumbents’ behavior (Mačkić, 2014) and fits well with larger 
literature that examines the effect of partisanship on LBT. Vuković (2017) explains 
how local incumbents in Croatia maximize their chances of staying in power for 
long periods of time by creating a small group of loyal but powerful supporters (the 
winning coalition). He argues that most likely because of low accountability and 
low transparency, local incumbents and the winning coalition can stay in power for 
long periods of time. Furthermore (Brender, 2003) also points that the local voting 
process might not reflect voters’ evaluation of local government performance, 
because local elections are decided, in most cases, on the basis of national party 
preferences and, in many cases voters do not possess the required information to 
evaluate the performance of local governments.
Second important result, on the city level, confirms a positive relationship 
between a left-wing incumbent (LEFT) and the level of OLBT. This result has 
theoretical roots in Ferejohn (1999) model and is in line with Gandía et al. 
(2016). Furthermore, legitimacy theory argues that transparency has a positive 
impact on the public’s perception of the incumbent; thus, left-wing incumbents 
defending larger budgets should be more anxious for their constituencies to ascribe 
legitimacy to their actions. In line with legitimacy theory – model 6, estimated at 
the municipality level, also indicates a positive effect of the political ideology of a 
liberal party (LIBERAL) on the level of OLBT – our third important result.
Our hypothesis that there is a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between political competition and the level of OLBT is confirmed only on the city 
level. The higher the WM between the incumbent and the runner up is (i.e. lower 
competition), the lower the level of OLBT. This result is theoretically expected and 
in line with da Cruz et al. (2016). Agents respond to the principal’s demands under 
the threat of being replaced if they act otherwise. However, models estimated on 
the municipality level report different story and point to positive effect of the WM 
on the level of OLBT (the lower the competition, the higher level of OLBT). Since 
this is not theoretically excepted result; more research is needed in order to further 
investigate the effect of WM on the level of OLBT. 
Furthermore, the positive effect of residents’ income per capita (INC) in all three 
samples is an established result in the literature, as shown by Giroux and McLelland 
(2003), Piotrowski and Van Ryzin (2007) and Styles and Tennyson (2007). It might 
be that, as argued by previous authors, residents with higher incomes have more 
access to and experience with the internet and, thus, demand more OLBT. If one 
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assumes self-interest on behalf of citizens, as agency theory does, then it follows 
logically that high-earning individuals who face higher marginal tax rates are more 
interested in budget transparency.
In line with studies conducted by Laswad et al. (2005) and Guillamón et al. (2011) 
this paper also confirms the positive relationship between the measure of fiscal 
capacity (FC) and OLBT in all three samples. In other words, richer LGUs with better 
fiscal conditions offer more online budget information. Muñoz et al. (2016) state that, 
according to the agency and legitimacy theory, incumbents in richer LGUs have 
more interest in signaling efficient management skills by increasing the voluntary 
dissemination of information due to higher concerns about losing their appointments. 
The paper offers three types of policy recommendations. First, the government 
should find a way to stimulate “less wealthy” LGUs and those with citizens of lower 
incomes to publish more key local budget documents online. Second, the online 
publication of key local budget documents should be prescribed by law since in, 
accordance with rule-of-law theory, LGUs are more willing to publish documents 
if they are prescribed by law. Third, since right-wing political parties publish fewer 
key local budget documents online, voters should think more about whom they are 
voting for and central government how to encourage political competition on the 
local level (e.g. introducing term limits to local incumbents).
6. Conclusion
This study empirically pinpoints determinants of OLBT in Croatia from 2013-
2017 for a unique dataset of 128 cities and 100 municipalities. Using a fixed 
effects Poisson model, this research indicates that political ideology (hypothesis 1) 
and political competition (hypothesis 2) determine the level of OLBT. The paper 
reports a negative and statistically significant relationship, on a total and the city 
level, between a right-wing political incumbent and the level of OLBT. At the same 
time, only at the city level results indicate a positive relationship between political 
competition and OLBT. The two control variables (residents’ income per capita and 
LGU’s fiscal capacity) show a positive relationship with the level of OLBT. This 
work contributes to the literature in several ways. First, these results represent an 
initial attempt at empirically validating these links on a sample that is still largely 
neglected in empirical research – a fiscally centralized, post-socialist, EU member 
state. Second, this research uses the original measure of OLBT, which can easily 
be replicated and collected for other countries and/or regions. Third, the results 
are calculated by applying a novel methodology to this unique and new dataset. 
Fourth, the results are robust since they show both the clear negative effect of right-
wing incumbents at the total and city levels on the one side and the positive effect 
of left-wing (at the city level) and liberal incumbents (at the municipality level). 
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This effect was not achieved by any previous studies on OLF/BT. Finally, this 
research confirms that political competition has an impact on the local level online 
budget transparency. Limitations of the research stem foremost from the narrow 
municipality base (only 100 units) which can be corrected for in the upcoming 
time period. Also it would be interesting to see would the results of the analysis 
change if the City of Zagreb, which has a unique status of city and county and it is 
the largest city in Croatia, is excluded. More research is needed in order to further 
investigate the effect of political competition variables on the level of OLBT/BT. 
Also, future research might focus more on the puzzling issues of the institutional 
and political economy aspect of OLBT, i.e., the factors that might better explain the 
consistent stubbornness of citizens voting for nontransparent politicians. However, 
the obtained results do indicate certain areas that should be addressed by the public 
policy officials. Mandatory prescription of online budget documents and limitations 
of term in office at the local level are only part of those that could and should be 
accompanied by incentives aimed at economically underdeveloped local units in 
Croatia. The combination of sticks and carrots should result in optimal outcomes 
vis-à-vis online local budget transparency in Croatia. 
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Politička tvrdoglavost i online proračunska transparentnost lokalnih 
jedinica1
Katarina Ott2, Velibor Mačkić3, Mihaela Bronić4
Sažetak
Online proračunska transparentnost lokalnih jedinica (OLBT) prepoznata je kao 
važna značajka dobrog upravljanja. U skladu s tim, OLBT se u ovom radu mjeri u 
svih 128 gradova i na uzorku od 100 općina u Hrvatskoj koristeći nekoliko ključnih 
lokalnih proračunskih dokumenata objavljenih na web stranicama lokalnih jedinica. 
Koristeći Poissonov panel model s fiksnim učinkom u razdoblju 2013. – 2017., 
pokazalo se da osim dohotka stanovnika i fiskalnog kapaciteta lokalnih jedinica, 
razinu OLBT-a određuju politička ideologija i politička konkurencija. Ovaj rad 
pridonosi rastućoj literaturi o proračunskoj transparentnosti utvrđivanjem važnosti 
političkih faktora kao odrednica OLBT-a u bivšoj socijalističkoj, fiskalno 
centraliziranoj, članici EU-a i otkriva zanimljivu tvrdoglavost građana koji 
dosljedno glasaju za netransparentne političare. Glavni nalaz je da su politički 
faktori (politička ideologija i politička konkurencija) važni kao odrednice OLBT-a, 
što u lokalnim jedinicama rezultira suboptimalnom ravnotežom s niskim razinama 
OLBT-a. Lokalni političar na vlasti zaključuje da OLBT nije od posebne važnost da 
bi mu izborna jedinica zamjerila netransparentnost. U takvom je okruženju navedeni 
zaključak valjan, jer ovaj rad dokazuje da birači, koji su tvrdoglavi u svojim 
glasačkim obrascima, odbijaju promijeniti lokalnog političara na vlasti iako je 
netransparentan.
Ključne riječi: online proračunska transparentnost, lokalne jedinice, Hrvatska, 
politička ekonomija, analiza panel podataka
JEL klasifikacija: H11, H70
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Appendices
Table 4: Panel summary of variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Observations
TOTAL SAMPLE
OLBI overall 1.179736 0.9216837 0 3 N = 1135
between 0.6852 0 3 n = 227
within 0.6177846 -0.6202643 3.579736 t = 5
INC overall 10.10154 .2850981 9.100087 10.87998 N = 1135
between 0.2777634 9.351308 10.70162 n = 227
within 0.0663366 9.529458 10.9464 t = 5
FC overall 3.074513 3.788127 0 9.307621 N = 1135
between 0.2501774 2.564352 3.702296 n = 227
within 3.779886 -0.6277832 8.679837 t = 5
RIGHT overall 0.5127753 0.5000571 0 1 N = 1135
between 0.465029 0 1 n = 227
within 0.1859245 -0.2872247 1.312775 t = 5
VM overall 23.26525 21.32724 0 100 N = 1135
between 19.1089 0.8 100 n = 227
within 9.538837 -53.27075 99.94525 t = 5
POP overall 8.65628 1.119838 5.666427 13.59692 N = 1135
between 1.121387 5.694245 13.59135 n = 227
within 0.0310595 8.491051 9.19339 t = 5
INTERNET overall 46.02301 15.67744 0 116.3099 N = 1135
between 15.05049 1.64983 94.32444 n = 227
within 4.473731 13.30521 69.65945 t = 5
CITY SAMPLE
OLBI overall 1.407874 0.9342422 0 3 N = 635
between 0.7101985 0 3 n = 127
within 0.6095973 -0.392126 3.407874 t = 5
INC overall 10.22643 0.1925057 9.719073 10.73738 N = 635
between 0.1880488 9.792834 10.70162 n = 127
within 0.0438083 10.05267 10.35409 t = 5
FC overall 3.150535 3.876562 0 9.307621 N = 635
between 0.2138668 2.709845 3.702296 n = 127
within 3.870695 -0.5517611 8.755859 t = 5
RIGHT overall 0.4897638 0.5002893 0 1 N = 635
between 0.4609918 0 1 n = 127
within 0.1977795 -0.3102362 1.289764 t = 5
Katarina Ott, Velibor Mačkić, Mihaela Bronić • Political Stubbornness and Online... 
Zb. rad. Ekon. fak. Rij. • 2019 • vol. 37 • no. 2 • 553-585 579
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Observations
VM overall 19.71543 16.29036 0 100 N = 635
between 14.27592 0.8 86.766 n = 127
within 7.92842 -33.22057 93.00343 t = 5
POP overall 9.325669 0.9700605 7.31322 13.59692 N = 635
between 0.9726335 7.332029 13.59135 n = 127
within 0.0311448 9.16044 9.862779 t = 5
INTERNET overall 49.86477 13.59638 12.60288 112.6886 N = 635
between 13.08431 23.89208 94.32444 n = 127
within 3.830849 31.12332 68.22894 t = 5
LEFT overall 0.2062992 0.4049668 0 1 N = 635
between 0.3633504 0 1 n = 127
within 0.1811286 -0.5937008 1.006299 t = 5
RFCRIGHT overall 2.235401 3.592336 0 10.17448 N = 635
between 3.292889 0 8.929113 n = 127
within 1.459511 -4.566551 9.082016 t = 5
MUNICIPALITY SAMPLE
OLBI overall 0.89 0.8192939 0 3 N = 500
between 0.5275252 0 2.4 n = 100
within 0.6286417 -0.51 3.29 t = 5
INC overall 9.942934 0.3042644 9.100087 10.87998 N = 500
between 0.2927487 9.351308 10.60634 n = 100
within 0.08696 9.370853 10.78779 t = 5
FC overall 2.977965 3.674339 0 9.080471 N = 500
between 0.2604542 2.564352 3.603766 n = 100
within 3.66517 -0.6258008 8.45467 t = 5
RIGHT overall 0.542 0.4987319 0 1 N = 500
between 0.4707999 0 1 n = 100
within 0.1698756 -0.258 1.342 t = 5
VM overall 27.77352 25.69238 0 100 N = 500
between 23.18395 3.276 100 n = 100
within 11.2655 -48.76248 104.4535 t = 5
POP overall 7.806155 0.5999088 5.666427 9.350711 N = 500
between 0.601524 5.694245 9.342002 n = 100
within 0.0309819 7.670096 7.994199 t = 5
INTERNET overall 41.14398 16.76762 0 116.3099 N = 500
between 16.00722 1.64983 92.67346 n = 100
within 5.181544 8.426177 64.78042 t = 5
LIBERAL overall 0.026 0.1592945 0 1 N = 500
between 0.1382576 0 0.8 n = 100
within 0.0800801 -0.774 0.826 t = 5
Source: Authors’ calculations
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Table 5: Model RE
Random-effects GLS regression Number of obs = 1,135
Group variable: ID Number of groups = 227
R-sq: Obs per group:
within = 0.3013 min = 5
between = 0.2484 avg = 5.0
overall = 0.2712 max = 5
Wald chi2(4) = 463.59
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed) Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
OLBT Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval]
INC 1.257597 .1320288 9.53 0.000 .9988251 1.516.368
FC  .0738498 .0047085 15.68 0.000 .0646213 .0830782
RIGHT  -.0801826 .064091 -1.25 0.211 -.2057987 .0454336
WM  -.001849 .0013705 -1.35 0.177 -.0045351 .0008372
_cons -11.66685 1.336858 -8.73 0.000 -14.28704 -9.046.656
sigma_u .5399188
sigma_e .57723139
rho .46663742 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
Source: Authors’ calculations
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Table 6: Model Hybrid
Random-effects GLS regression Number of obs = 1,135
Group variable: ID Number of groups = 227
R-sq: Obs per group:
within = 0.3040 min = 5
between = 0.2507 avg = 5.0
overall = 0.2746 max = 5
Wald chi2(8) = 469.15
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed) Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
OLBI Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval]
diff__INC 1.83498 .3021889 6.07 0.000 1.242701 2.42726
diff__FC .0688333 .0052927 13.01 0.000 .0584598 .0792067
diff__RIGHT -.0667035 .0930152 -0.72 0.473 -.24901 .1156029
diff__WM -.0012479 .0018172 -0.69 0.492 -.0048095 .0023137
mean__INC 1.20279 .2091193 5.75 0.000 .792924 1.612656
mean__FC -.06577 .2289895 -0.29 0.774 -.5145811 .3830411
mean__ RIGHT -.1122455 .0889327 -1.26 0.207 -.2865503 .0620594
mean__WM -.0020873 .0021234 -0.98 0.326 -.0062491 .0020745
_cons -10.66197 170.595 -6.25 0.000 -14.00557 -7.318368
sigma_u .53899336
sigma_e .57723139
rho .46578359 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
Source: Authors’ calculations
Table 7: Mundlak test
. test mean__INC=mean__FC=mean__ RIGHT=mean__WM==0
-1 mean__INC – mean__FC = 0
-2 mean__INC – mean__ RIGHT = 0
-3 mean__INC – mean__WM = 0
-4 mean__INC = 0
chi2( 4) = 74.43
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Source: Authors’ calculations
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Table 8: Poisson, ordered probit and multinominal logit – total sample
OLBT POISSON OPROBIT MLOGIT
INC 2.629 (0.688)*** 1.601 (0.134)***
FC 0.049 (0.006)*** 0.101 (0.009)***
RIGHT -0.196 (0.094)** -0.135 (0.068)**
WM 0.000 (0.002) -0.003 (0.002)**
cut1 _cons 15.532 (1.352)***
cut2 _cons 16.864 (1.363)***
cut3 _cons 17.898 (1.370)***















N 1,115.0 1,135.0 1,135.0
AIC 1641.816 2566.097 2544.469
BIC 1661.882 2601.338 2619.985
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; Numbers in brackets represent standard deviations.
Source: Authors’ calculations
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Table 10: Multinominal logit – city sample
OLBT Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
0 INC -3.374 (0.756)*** -3.830 (0.865)*** -3.891 (0.778)***
FC -0.134 (0.039)*** -0.131 (0.039)*** -0.126 (0.039)***
RIGHT 0.286 (0.262)
WM -0.007 (0.009) -0.006 (0.009) -0.002 (0.008)
_cons 33.604 (7.671)*** 38.309 (8.728)*** 38.803 (7.837)***
2 INC 3.621 (0.649)*** 3.573 (0.619)*** 3.600 (0.639)***
FC 0.065 (0.026)** 0.066 (0.026)** 0.066 (0.026)**
RIGHT 0.082 (0.219)
WM -0.013 (0.007)* -0.013 (0.007)* -0.013 (0.007)**
_cons -37.316 (6.672)*** -36.798 (6.325)*** -37.059 (6.520)***
3 INC 8.887 (1.195)*** 9.086 (1.125)*** 9.289 (1.193)***
FC 0.230 (0.037)*** 0.235 (0.038)*** 0.227 (0.037)***
RIGHT -0.413 (0.319)







_cons -93.192 (12.336)*** -95.211 (11.605)*** -97.458 (12.301)***
N 635.0 635.0 635.0
AIC 1420.838 1418.118 1421.593
BIC 1487.643 1484.922 1488.397
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Numbers in brackets represent standard deviations.
Source: Authors’ calculations
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